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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
- vs.-





S·TAT'E.MENT OF THE FA·C1T'S 
T·he State produced evidence that the Pehrson Hard-
ware Store located in Salt Lake 1C·ounty, State of Utah, 
was burglarized between 6 p.m. on January 6, 1964 and 
8 :30 a.m. the ne!xt morning ( R-30). En try was apparently 
through a hole in the roof (R-36). 'The store was found in 
general disorder and disarray with empty boxes and 
boxes containing various firearms strewn about (R-31). 
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Mr. Pehrson, speaking from his records, stated that 
one of the items missing was a 357 Magnum pistol, valued 
at $115 (Rr-39) with the Serial No. 375-66 (R-54). He 
could not testify that the particular gun was stolen (R-
85). 
Five days thereafter the gun was taken from an auto-
mobile owned and driven by Bates Anderson (R-11) and 
in which the appellant togethe-r \vith two other occupants 
"\Vas riding in Las Vegas, Nevada (R--64). 
At the hearing on the appellant's motion to supress, 
the Las Vegas officer stated that he received information 
from an anonymous source, that unknown persons w~re 
changing license plates on a vehicle of the description of 
the automobile in which the appellant was riding (R-12). 
He observed the vehicle p·ulling into gas station and ap-
proached the vehicle while it was on private pro1)erty 
(R-10). The officer asked the driver for his license and 
registration and in this process observed a 22 calibre re-
volver in the console of the auto (R-13). Thereupon, the 
officer placed the driver and occupants under arrest and 
searched the auto (R-13). There ''Tas no "Tarrant for 
arrest or search warrant and the search was conducted 
as part of a standard procedure by the X evada police 
when an auto is about to be to\Yed (R-13). The appeJlant 
testified the arresting officer sa\v only son1e cartridges 
in the console and while seeking the auton1obile registra-
tion ordered the driver (R-23) to open the glove compart-
ment. When a revolver fell out, the officer dre"T his pistol 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
and ordered everyone out of the car. The appellant was 
arrested for investigation of certain felonies hut he was 
not trie·d for any offense in Nevada (R-26). 
S'TAT'EMENT OF NAT'URE O·F THE 'CASE 
T'his is a criminal ap·peal from a conviction of grand 
larceny rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, 
S·alt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Merrill C. 
Faux, p·residing. 
DIS.POSITION IN LOWER ,C.OURT 
T'he appellant was ·charged with Second Degree Bur-
glary and Grand Larceny. Upon a p1ea of not guilty a 
jury trial was had and a verdict rendered finding the 
appellant guilty of Grand Larceny. P'rior to trial Appel-
lant made a motion to supress and after hearing the court 
denied the same. 
REiLIEF SOUGH·T ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to reverse the~ lower court's rul-
ing denying Appellant's motion to suppress, to reverse 
the conviction and to obtain a new trial. 
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STIAT'EMENT OF POINT'S RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
T·HE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENIT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVI!CTION OF GRAND LARCENY. 
POINT II. 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN GIVING IN.STRU·CTION 6 
AND IN FAILING T10 GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUES'TED 
INSTRU·CTION N·O. 1. 
POINT III. 
·COUR'T ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MO'TION 
TO SUP·PRESS T'HE EVIDENCE IN THAT THE EVIDENCE 
WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED WITHOUT SEARCH WAR-
RAN·T, WARRANT F 10R ARREST OR SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO AN ARREST. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TH·E EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVI1CTION OF GRAND LARJCENY. 
The conviction in the lower court was based solely 
on alleged possession of a weapon, to \vit, 357 mangun1 
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pistol, "\vhich apparently was from the Pehrson l-Iard-
ware store (R-35) .. However, the owner indicated that 
the gun could have been sold (R-44) and could not testify 
that the gun was stolen (R-85). Officer Reed of Las 
~\T egas testified that the appellant indicated that the gun 
belonged to him and that he had p·urchased it from the 
man in Salt Lake two months prior (R-88). Another 
salient fact is that the pistol was not found on the person 
of the appellant, but rather in a glove compartment of an 
automobile owned by the driver Bates Anderson, in which 
t'vo other occupants "\Vere present. 
Under this state of facts, the law in this jurisdiction 
is clear. No conviction can stand merely on bare possession 
'vhen not coupled ''Tith other culpatory or incriminating 
circumstances. State v. Kinsey, 77 U. 348, 295 P. 247 
( 1931). Also, see cases cited therein. A later interpreta-
tion of the Kinsey case is found in St~ate v. Dyett, 114 U. 
379, 199 P.2d 155 (19,48) wherein this court cited the 
Kinsey case, together with State v. Barretta, 47 U. 479, 
155 P. 343, for the proposition that mere association of 
an accused with property recently stolen in insufficient. 
The Dyett court further enunciated the proposition that 
1nerely p·roving constructive possession of recently stolen 
property will not sustain the burden inasmuch as it would 
be pushing the role too far to require of one accused of a 
crime an explanation of his possession of stolen p-roperty, 
when p·ossession could, also, with equal right, be, attri-
butable to another. The instant case clearly falls within 
the framework of the court's language. 
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IThe app·ellants further submits that in order that 
the prima facie evidence role of recent stolen property 
may become operative in a given fact situation, such 
possession must be recent, personal, exclusive, and con-
scious. State v. Butterfield, 70 U. 529, 261 P. 804 (1927). 
State v. Morris, 70 U. 570, 262 P. 107 (1927). Also, 
see 32 Am Jur., see 141. There is no doubt that this rule 
prevails in our jurisdiction. 
An illustrative ease, setting forth the above rule is 
found in Davis v. St~ate (Alaska), 369 P2d 87 (1962) 
'vherein the court reversed on the grounds that the stolen 
items found in a garage adjoining the accused house did 
not sho'v exclusive possession. The •Court stated: 
The Court further stated: 
"Possession to be exclusive must be to the 
exclusion of all not party to the crime." 
"Mere constructive possession, as would be 
the case where possession is not actual on person 
is not enough." 
The Alaska Court concluded that if other persons 
have equal rights and facility of access with the accused 
to the place 'vhere stolen goods are discovered, the pos-
session not being exclusive or personal is of no ,veight. 
'The appellant llrges that the evidence is insufficient 
to establish personal, exclusive and conscious possession 
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of recently stole·n property and consequently the con-
viction must fall. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTR,UC'TION 6 
AND IN FAILING 'T'O GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUES~ED 
INSTRUCTIO·N NO. 1. 
T·he trial court instructed as follows : 
You are instructed that the law of this State 
includes, as part of the definition of "larceny'' the 
following: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when 
the person in possession fails to make a satisfac-
tory explanation, shall be deemed p~rima facie evi-
dence of guilt. 
The term "prima facie," as used in this in-
struction, means at first sight or as the face of 
things. 
Accordingly, such evidence is presumptive 
evidence, but does not mean that, unless it is re-
butte·d by other evide·nce or discredited by cir-
cumstances, it becomes conclusive of the fact of 
guilt. 
'The ap~pellant contends that the above instruction is 
insufficient as a matte-r of law in that said instruction 
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does not state that possession must be personal, exclusive, 
and conscious. See State v. Morris, Supra; State v. Ken-
sey, Supra; State v. Brooks, 101 U. 584, 126 P·.2d 1044 
(1942). The appellant further contends that instruction 
was prejudicial to substantial rights of the appellant. 
T'he p-rosecution based its entire case upon the theory 
of reeent possession. No evidence vv-as introduced to con-
nect the ~defendant at the scene of crime other than the 
possession of the pistol. Possession therefore was the 
crux of the state's case. Not to have submitted a proper 
instruction in such circumstances deprived the defendant 
of his full measure of justice to have his guilt or inno-
cence submitted to the jury under proper legal instruc-
tions T·he purpose of an instruction is to furnish guid-
ance to the j·ury in their deliberations and to aid them in 
arriving at a proper verdict. 53 A1n. Jur., Sec. 590. An 
erroneous and incomplete instruction in a n1aterial and 
significant aspeet of the case \V holly falls short of this 
purpose. 
The term "possession" is a ter1n of art and has spe-
cial meaning .depending on the context in \Yhich it is 
spoken. In various areas of tlu_~ la,v, this elusive tern1 
has a different and varied meaning. In larceny cases, 
"possession" has been defined as exclusive, personal, and 
conscious. See cases cited above. A jury of laYnlen can-
not be capable of affixing the technical Ineaning of pos-
session \vithout the guidance of the court. 
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·T·he instant case can be analogized with State v. 
Horne 62 U. 37·6, 220 P. 378 (19·23), wherein this court 
held prejudicial error was committed when the lower 
court imp·roperly defined the words "feloniously.'' The 
rationale of the court was to the effect that the~ trial 
court's definition was too narrow and whereas S"Uch terms 
are well understood to the judges and lawyers, when used 
instructions to a jury, the terms should be carefully de-
fined. ·The trial court in this instance faile;d to give the 
prop·er instruction, leaving the jury to surmise, according 
to their own imagination, what facts would amount to pos-
session in larceny cases. Had the court given the proper 
instruction, the jury eould well have found that the pistol, 
having been found in a glove compartment of the auto-
mobile owned by another and in which the defendant was 
only one of four occup.ants, was not in the "possession'' 
of the defendant. 
The lower court's error 1s further aggrevated by 
the fact that the defendant requested an instruction which 
clearly and properly defined the term "possession". (T-
17). A simple reading of the requested instruction as com-
pared with the court's instruction clearly shows that no 
part of the request was given, except that portion which 
comes from the Utah Statute 76-38-1, (as amended 19153). 
The trial court is obligated to properly instruct the. jury 
on the law even though the requeste1d instructron is 
erroneous. State v. Scott, Utah 37 P. 335· (189·4). 
Howeve-r, the app·ellant does admit that the requested 
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instruction was erroneous. The Court in the Seott case 
set forth the prop·er role of the trial court when it state·d: 
"In a criminal case, the :Court should see that 
the case goes to the jury in a -clear and intelligent 
manner, so that they may have a correct under-
standing of what it is that they are to decide and it 
should state to them fully the law applicable to the 
case. It is to the Court that the accused has a right 
to look to see that he has a fair trial . . ." 
''A jury of inexperienced laymen could hardly 
be expected to app~ly the rules applicable to this 
class of testimony without some assistance from 
the eourt.'' (T'his case involved an erroneuos in-
struction with regard to circumstantial evidence.) 
Another factor which should be considered is the termin-
ology of the trial court's language ,, ... herein the court 
indicated that larceny is defined as recent possession of 
stolen prop·erty. Although much confusion exists, the true 
rule is th~at recent possession of stolen property is mere-
ly an evidentiary fact tending to establish that. ultimate 
issue of guilt or innocence, 22 Anz. Jur., 140. Also, see 
101 Am. 51, Rep. 501. No \Yhere can there be found any 
authority that recent possession is part of the definition 
of the crime of larceny. 1To define larceny in the ter1ns 
set forth by the trial court expands the meaning far be-
yond the statute and case la\v. The trial court co1npletely 
ignored the precedent in our state ,, ... ith regard to this 
matter. S-ee State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d ~28, 
( 1943), reversed 1-15 U tal1 1 G:2, l-t-3 P. 2d 494 ( 1944) 
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'vherein the court sets forth a prop.er instruction as ap-
plied to the issue raised by the appellant, to wit: 
"If it is found from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that someone had committed 
larceny as charged, that defendant was found 
in possession of recently stolen goods and that 
defendant failed to give a satisfactory exp~lana­
tion, there would arise an inference that the· de-
fendant committed larceny and that such infer-
ence might be considered in determining whether 
the jury was convinced beyond reasonable doubt of 
defendant's guilt." 
The lower court's instruction would directly mislead 
the minds of the jury, in that, the jury could find that 
the appellant was in possession of recently stolen p·rop·-
erty without satisfactory explanation and thus find him 
guilty of larceny "vithout finding that the defendant felon-
iously took or carried away the personal property of an-
other. Compare court's instruction No. 5 and No. 6. This 
conclusion is inescapable when one considers the fact that 
the defendant was also charge·d with burglary in the 
third degree and the jury faile·d to return the ve·rdict of 
guilty in that count, consequently it is apparent that the 
jury did not find facts sufficient to belief that the defend-
ant entered the hardware store. IIaving not so found, the 
jury could not have believed the defendant was involved 
in the theft. The only fact of which the jury was ap-
praised was possession and if possession is deemed as 
part of definition of larceny the jury obviously fPlt that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
possession, of itself, was sufficient. T'his is totally preju-
dicial to the defendant ill that it permits a finding of guilt 
of larceny on facts which are only legally deemed prima 
facie evidence of guilt and flys in the face of State v. 
Hall, supra. Also, see State v. Allen, 56 U. 37, 189· P. 84 
(1920) wherein the definition of larceny did not include 
possession of recent stolen property. The balance of the 
court's instruction in no way corrects or alleviates the 
trial court's error and the app·ellant submits that in-
struction no. 6 constitutes prejudicial error and merits 
reversal. 
POINT III. 
·COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLAN.T'S MO'TION 
TO SUP'PRESS THE EVIDENCE IN THAT THE EVIDENCE 
WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED WITHOUT SEARCH WAR-
RANT, WARRANT FOR ARREST OR SEARCH IN·CIDENT 
TO AN ARRE~ST. 
1The ap·pellant submits that the evidence produced 
at the he·aring in app·ellant's motion to suppress indicates 
that the search of the vehicle in \Yhich the appellant was 
an occup-ant was without search "rarrant, arrest warrant 
and without probable cause to search. The eYidence shows 
that arrest was incident to the search \Yhich is in viola-
tion of the appellant's constitutional rights. Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 lT.S. 643, 6 L. ed. 1081, 81 S.C. 1684 (1961). 
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At the time the occupants of the vehicle we·re ap-
proached by the Las Vegas p·olice officer, they were driv-
ing into a gas station (R-10) and from all appearances 
were not violating any laws. ·The officers observed the 
registered owner of the vehicle· driving. A disp,ute arose 
as to what point the occupants were placed under arrest. 
The officer testified that they were arrested after he ob-
served a 22 pistol in the console (R-12) and the appellant 
testified that there vvas no pistol in the console, only 
cartridges and they were ordered out of the· car and held 
at bay while the driver-owner opened the glove· compart-
ment at the order of the officer whereupon the 3 pistols 
fell out (R-17). It is undisputed that the search was made 
purely as a matter of procedure for vehicles which are 
to be towed away (~13) and not in an effort to secure 
fruits of the crime, instrumentalities of the crime or for 
self-protection. Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S·. 217, 4 L.Ed. 2d 668, 
80 S. Ct. 683. 
1The search should be condemned as purely explora-
tory. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S:. 344, 75 L. 
Ed. 374 (1930), and U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S~. 452., S. ~Ct. 
420, 76'L. Ed. 877, 82ALR775 (1g.32). 
Looking at the evidence most favorable to the state, 
one must conclude that there was no valid arrest. The 
arresting officer's information that persons in an auto-
mobile of the description in which the defendant was an 
occupant were exchanging license plates was not suffi-
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cient to justify an arrest since no misdemeanor was com-
mitted in his presence. UCA. 77-13-3 (1) (as amended, 
1953). Nor was there any facts upon which the arresting 
officer could reasonably believe that the occupants had 
committed a felony. UCA. 77-13-3 (5) (as amended, 1953). 
The sole reason for the search was the fact that it 
was regular p~rocedure to search an automobile which was 
going to he towed away (R-13). No "inherent necessity 
of the situation at the time of the arrest'' existed. Trupi-
ano v. U.S.J 339 D.'S. 669·, 92 L.Ed. 1663, 68 S. (Ct. 1229, 
overruled on another point in U.S. v. Rabinowitz} 339' U.S. 
56, 9'4 L. Ed. ·6·53, 70 S. ~ct. 430. A search, whether incident 
to an arrest or not, cannot he justified by what turns up. 
People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528. 
1The appellant respectfully subn1its that the lower 
court erred in giving improper instruction, and in failing 
to give defendant's requested instructions which "~as pre-
judicial to the substantial rights of the defendant; further 
that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the verdict 
of larceny and the court erred in denying defendant s 
motion to suppress. For these reasons, the appellant 
urges that this court reverse and remand the cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jll\11 MIT,STJN AG A 
Legal Defender 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
